National identity among economic and non-economic immigrants by Campbell, S
Rev Econ Household
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-018-9439-8
National identity among economic and non-economic
immigrants
Stuart Campbell 1
Received: 7 June 2018 / Accepted: 25 October 2018
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract
Using recent survey data from the UK, I show that immigrants who originally
migrated for family reasons or as refugees are more than twice as likely to report a
host national identity as those who migrated for economic reasons. A large part of
this gap is explained by differences between immigrant groups in national origin and
other observed characteristics. However, even after accounting for such differences
comprehensively, family immigrants and refugees remain around 13 and 8% more
likely to report a host national identity respectively. These two groups still remain
more likely to report a host national identity when restricting the analysis to
immigrants without citizenship, to those with only weak incentives to acquire
citizenship, or to those from origin countries without linguistic or cultural
connections to the UK via the British Commonwealth. I suggest that average
differences in time horizons between immigrant groups may be an important
unobserved explanatory factor.
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1 Introduction
National identity binds together heterogeneous groups of individuals within and
across national borders. Governments have actively cultivated uniﬁed national
identities within their own territories, in the belief that these collective afﬁliations
foster social cohesion (Berry 1974; Uberoi and McLean 2007). The existing
empirical evidence on pro-social behaviour and redistributive preferences is broadly
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supportive of this belief: people do seem to be more generous and cooperative
towards those with whom they share a common identity (Bernhard et al. 2006; Chen
and Li 2009; Costa i Font and Cowell 2015). In an age of rising tension over
international migration, a key question for policy-makers in immigrant-receiving
countries is therefore whether the foreign-born retain the identity of their origin
country, or come to adopt the identity of their hosts. Public concern over these
matters is high (Kellner 2007; Kiss and Park 2014).
There is a literature in economics which responds to this concern, much of which
has been guided by Akerlof and Kranton’s (2000) contribution on the economics of
identity (Casey and Dustmann 2010; Constant et al. 2009; Constant and Zimmer-
mann 2008; Dustmann 1996; Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Manning and Roy
2010; Masella 2013). One of the key insights driving this work is that adopting a new
national identity involves social and psychological costs and beneﬁts. The costs arise
from abandoning the previous identity and adapting to new behavioural reference
points in the host country, while the beneﬁts are associated with increasing prospects
for social integration. As with other country-speciﬁc investments, the relative weight
of these costs and beneﬁts must partly be determined by the length of time that an
immigrant intends to stay in the host country. The expected gains from adopting the
host national identity should be greatest for those who intend to stay permanently,
but lower for those with uncertain time horizons, and lower still for those who intend
to return to the home country after a short period of time.
Time horizons are partially embedded in the original motive for migration. For
example, refugees often expect to stay longer than those in other immigrant groups,
since safety concerns reduce the possibility of return to the home country. Family
immigrants are also likely to envision a longer stay than others on average, since co-
ordinated relocation of partners and children is costly, both on arrival in the host
country and for any proposed departure. In contrast, economic and student immi-
grants often have the option or the explicit intent to return to their home country more
quickly. Although we cannot observe these average differences in time horizons
directly, existing empirical work does suggest that family immigrants are less prone
to out-migration than others (Bijwaard 2010; Home Ofﬁce 2014), and that patterns of
human capital investment and earnings assimilation among refugees are also con-
sistent with a longer intended stay (Borjas 1982; Cortes 2004; Khan 1997).
My innovation is to introduce these implicit differences in time horizons to the
analysis of immigrant national identity. Given a longer expected length of stay,
refugees and family immigrants have the most to gain from adopting the host
national identity, while economic and student immigrants have the least. Although it
is well established that time horizons are important for the economic assimilation of
immigrants, the question of whether immigrant national identity may also be
responsive to the expected length of stay has so far remained unanswered. This is an
important omission, since immigrant national identity matters both for the wellbeing
of immigrants themselves (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, suggest that the choice of
identity may be “…the most important ‘economic’ decision people make”) as well as
for the acceptance of immigrants in the host population (Manning and Roy 2010).
I examine how uptake of the host national identity varies between economic,
student, family, and refugee immigrants. I use a unique survey measure to distinguish
between these groups, and construct a multinational sample of over 76,000
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immigrants in a large and diverse immigrant-receiving country. The data I use come
from the UK, but the principle should apply more generally: other things equal,
longer time horizons in the host country increase the expected gains from adoption of
the host national identity.
Non-economic immigrants are now a substantial proportion of the foreign-born
population in many immigrant-receiving countries. Several host countries saw a shift
away from economic migration and towards family reuniﬁcation over the second half
of the twentieth century (Ferrie and Hatton 2015). Large exporters of higher edu-
cation such as the UK and the USA have also seen a rising proportion of immigrants
arrive as students and stay on to work after completing their studies (Bratsberg 1995).
Moreover, from the early 2010s onwards, several countries have offered asylum to
unprecedented numbers of refugees, particularly those ﬂeeing conﬂict in North
Africa and the Middle East. For Europe, this culminated in a ‘refugee crisis’ in the
summer and autumn of 2015. The question of how non-economic immigrants adjust
to life in the host country has rarely been more important for government policy or
for human welfare.
My primary ﬁnding is that refugees and family immigrants are substantially more
likely to report the host national identity than economic or student immigrants. A
large part of this elevated tendency is explained by differences in observed demo-
graphic and human capital characteristics, but even after accounting for such dif-
ferences, family immigrants and refugees remain around 13 and 8% more likely to
report a host national identity respectively. These two groups still remain more likely
to report the host national identity when restricting the analysis to immigrants
without citizenship, to those with only weak incentives to acquire citizenship, or to
those from origin countries without linguistic or cultural connections to the UK via
the British Commonwealth.
2 Related literature
Identity is a topic of central importance for social scientists. Although it is not seen as
a traditional area of interest for economists, a theoretical literature on the subject has
been building in the discipline for two decades (Akerlof 1997; Akerlof and Kranton
2000, 2002, 2005; Battu et al. 2007; Bénabou and Tirole 2011; Bisin et al. 2011b,
2016; Kranton 2016), drawing principally on earlier work in sociology and social
psychology (Berry 1997; Merton 1968; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Wetherell 1996). A
body of empirical work in economics is also now becoming well established
(Bernhard et al. 2006; Chen and Li 2009; Costa i Font and Cowell 2015; Depetris-
Chauvin et al. 2018).
The dominant view of identity applied in economics comes from Akerlof and
Kranton (2000). In this approach, identity is person’s sense of self, arising partly
from the social categories to which she belongs. Social categories may emerge on the
basis of characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, or language, as well as nationality.
Each social category is associated with different behavioural norms, and following
these norms is rewarding for the individual, while deviation can generate disutility
for the individual and for others. By shaping the rewards associated with different
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actions in this way, identity is implicated in a wide range of economic and social
behaviour for individuals and groups.
National identity is a particularly important aspect of identity since, through its
inﬂuence on intergroup behaviour, it relates to the functioning of societies as a
whole. This is especially the case where a country is ethnically diverse or has a large
immigrant population. In such countries, some individuals may maintain a minority
ethnic or national identity, either exclusively or in addition to adopting the identity of
the majority. These minority identities have often been seen as a potential source of
economic inefﬁciency. For this reason, one strand of work examines the role of
minority identity in labour market performance (Battu and Zenou 2010; Bisin et al.
2011a; Constant et al. 2006; Drydakis 2013; Islam and Raschky 2015; Mason 2004;
Nekby and Rödin 2010, Pendakur and Pendakur 2005), while another examines
minority identity and educational attainment (Nekby et al. 2009; Schüller 2015).
Several authors have applied a version of Berry’s (1997) two-dimensional
acculturation framework in this setting, distinguishing between four strategies that
immigrants or ethnic minority individuals may choose for interaction with the
majority society: ‘integration’, ‘assimilation’, ‘separation’, and ‘marginalisation’
(Constant et al. 2006; Constant and Zimmermann 2008; Drydakis 2013; Nekby and
Rödin 2010; Nekby et al. 2009). ‘Integration’ describes the case where a minority
individual takes on the identity of the majority but maintains her own minority
identity. ‘Assimilation’ is where she takes on the majority identity and abandons the
minority identity. ‘Separation’ is where she maintains only the minority identity, and
‘marginalisation’ is where she maintains neither the majority nor minority identities.
In most studies, ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ are seen to produce the most
desirable outcomes for both the immigrant and the host society, while ‘separation’
and ‘marginalisation’ are seen to be the least desirable.
While work on labour market and educational outcomes suggests that identity is
important in the economic lives of immigrants, only a handful of papers address the
determinants of immigrant identity itself. A large proportion use data from Germany.
One early example is Dustmann (1996), who shows that adoption of the host identity
among immigrants in Germany is associated with factors which increase exposure to
the host society, such as age on arrival, years of residence, language ﬂuency, edu-
cational background, and the presence of children. Constant and Zimmermann
(2008) and Constant et al. (2009) demonstrate the importance of pre-migration
characteristics such as religion, home country education, and country of origin.
Casey and Dustmann (2010) add that immigrant national identity is correlated across
generations, which suggests that exposure to a particular national identity within the
home may also be important.
In the UK, Georgiadis and Manning (2013) show that immigrants and minority
groups in England and Wales are more likely to identify as British if they report
feeling tolerated and respected by the majority society, while Manning and Roy
(2010) ﬁnd that immigrants to Great Britain from poor and less democratic countries
tend to adopt the British national identity more readily than others. In this latter case,
the authors suggest that uptake of the host identity is driven partly by a favourable
comparison of the host country with the home country in economic and political
terms.
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No study so far has linked the adoption of a new national identity to the average
time horizons of different immigrant groups. This is surprising, given the large body
of work linking immigrant time horizons to other country-speciﬁc investments (see
Dustmann and Görlach 2016, for a recent review). The key insight from this work is
that temporary immigrants face weaker incentives to invest in country-speciﬁc
human capital than permanent immigrants, since the expected return on this human
capital is necessarily lower for those who plan to re-migrate (Dustmann 1993, 1999,
2008). Temporary immigrants are therefore less likely to spend time and money
acquiring the native language or building networks of social contacts, and are less
likely to bear the cost of bringing their families to the host country with them (Adda
et al. 2015).
An important innovation in the literature on immigrant time horizons is due to
Cortes (2004), who connects these insights on temporary migration to differences
between immigrant groups, comparing earnings assimilation trajectories for eco-
nomic and refugee immigrants in the USA. She observes that implicit differences in
time horizons between these immigrant groups are reﬂected in their human capital
accumulation activities and rates of earnings assimilation (Borjas 1982, and Khan
1997, make similar observations). Cortes (2004) cites “fear or threat of persecution”
in the home country as the principal reason that refugees may have longer average
time horizons in the host country, though it is possible there are other factors that
raise the cost of leaving for this particular immigrant group, such as a lack of possible
third-country destinations. As I note above, family immigrants also face additional
costs of migration on arrival and on departure from the host country, due to the co-
ordinated nature of family migration.
If family immigrants and refugees do tend to have longer time horizons in the host
country than economic immigrants, and if national identity behaves in the same way
as other country-speciﬁc investments, then it seems reasonable to hypothesise that
family immigrants and refugees will be more likely to report a host national identity
than economic immigrants. This should be the case even where immigrants from the
different groups are similar in a range of other characteristics already emphasized in
the literature as determinants of immigrant national identity, such as exposure to the
host society and characteristics of the home country. Student immigrants have been
relatively neglected in the migration literature as a whole, but given that most pre-
sumably ﬁrst arrive with the intention only to complete a qualiﬁcation before
returning to the home country, one might expect this group to have short time
horizons in the host country, and therefore have a relatively low propensity to report
the host national identity.
One reason for the apparent lack of research linking national identity to the time
horizons of different immigrant groups may be that data directly identifying these
groups are rare, and indirect methods of identifying them carry the risk of substantial
measurement error. For example, Cortes (2004) infers refugee status from country of
origin and year of arrival, but this method would falsely identify a large number of
cases in the UK context, since only a small proportion of immigrants from any
particular country arrive as refugees in any given year (Bell et al. 2013). In this paper,
I am able to overcome substantial problems of measurement error by using a direct
survey measure of immigrant group. This allows me to combine insights from the
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My data come from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) between January 2010 and
October 2017 (Ofﬁce for National Statistics 2018). The LFS is the UK’s largest
regular household survey, with around 40,000 responding households every calendar
quarter. The survey records responses from a stratiﬁed random sample of addresses
ﬁve times over a one year period, with a ﬁfth of the survey rotating to a new sample
of addresses in each quarter. Households are approached at all waves of the survey
whether or not they have responded previously, but are not followed if they move to
a new address.
There is insufﬁcient variation in national identity over the ﬁve waves of the survey
to make use of the panel aspect of the data.1 However, I am able to use the different
waves of the survey to increase the size of the cross-sectional sample. I prioritise
those who respond in Wave 1 of the survey, since this wave has the highest response
rate. I then expand the sample by seeking a non-missing observation on those who
missed the ﬁrst wave sequentially in Waves 2, 3, 4, and 5. Due to the large proportion
of immigrants who miss the ﬁrst wave of the survey but appear at some point in later
waves, this strategy covers around 40% more immigrants than the more commonly-
used alternative strategy of using the ﬁrst wave alone.
Unfortunately, the data do not consistently identify which respondents are sharing
the same household. This means that I cannot separate family immigrants who share
a household with those from other immigrant groups, and I cannot cluster standard
errors at the household level. In addition, around a third of responses in the LFS are
by proxy. I exclude these proxy responses on the grounds that an individual’s
national identity may be imperfectly observed by others, even close family members.
I also restrict the sample to foreign-born adults aged at least 16, on whom I have
information on national identity along with the full-set of explanatory variables
discussed below.2 My ﬁnal analytical sample consists of 76,024 immigrants.
3.2 National identity
All respondents to the LFS are asked ‘How would you describe your national
identity? Please choose all that apply’.3 They may choose from the constituent
1 Less than 2% of adult immigrant respondents change their reported identity over the ﬁve waves of the
LFS.
2 The exception is the ‘years of education’ variable, which is missing for around 7% of respondents. I use
a missing dummy to account for this in the regressions below.
3 The wording of this question was slightly different before 2011: ‘What do you consider your national
identity to be? Please choose as many as apply.’ Residents of Northern Ireland were not asked about
national identity before 2011.
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national identities of the UK (‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’, and ‘Northern Irish’),
and additional categories for ‘British’ and ‘Other’. I group respondents who report a
British national identity with those who report an English, Scottish, Welsh, or
Northern Irish identity.4 Around 5% of the sample report both a British and a foreign
national identity, and I include these individuals as ‘British’, on the grounds that they
have adopted the host identity in some sense. In Berry’s (1997) acculturation fra-
mework, the outcome I examine can therefore be considered mostly an indicator of
identity ‘assimilation’, with some cases of ‘integration’. This is contrasted only with
identity ‘separation’, since there is no way to observe a ‘marginalised’ identity in
these data, due to the form of the survey question. This is a sensible simpliﬁcation of
the two-dimensional acculturation framework for my purposes, since the value of
adopting the host identity should vary for different immigrant groups in response to
different average time horizons, regardless of whether the home identity is main-
tained. Table 4 in the Appendix shows results with ‘assimilation’ and ‘separation’ as
separate outcomes. The key group differences are larger in relative terms when using
‘integration’ alone as the outcome variable, although the base probability of reporting
an ‘integrated’ identity is low.
National identity is a multidimensional concept with legal, affective, and ethnic
components, and respondents may be inﬂuenced by any or all of these components
when answering the survey question (Heath and Tilley 2005; Nandi and Platt 2015).
For example, a respondent may be inclined to report a British national identity on the
basis of her legal status or citizenship. She may also be inﬂuenced by affective
factors arising from contact and experiences with the host society, or she may include
or exclude herself on the basis of her ethnicity. I aim to account for factors which
predict each of these dimensions of national identity in my empirical speciﬁcation
below.
Some authors have suggested that binary questions about national identity such as
that in the LFS may lack the precision required to capture identity as distinct from
legal citizenship (Manning and Roy 2010; Nandi and Platt 2015; Platt 2014). Partly
in response to these concerns, Georgiadis and Manning (2013) compare a binary
national identity question similar to that in the LFS with a more detailed set of related
questions in the British Citizenship Survey, which attempt to the gauge the strength
rather than simply the direction of national identiﬁcation. These questions include
whether each respondent feels she is “…part of British society” and how strongly she
feels she “…belong[s] to Britain”. The authors ﬁnd similar patterns of response to all
of these questions, which suggests that binary measures are able to capture aspects of
identity beyond legal citizenship. I show below that my results are similar when
restricting the analysis to non-citizens.
Georgiadis and Manning (2013) also show that people are less likely to report the
host national identity if they feel that they are discriminated against. The LFS does
not ask questions about perceived discrimination, but it is possible that refugees face
stronger discrimination than other immigrant groups in the UK (Bloch 2008; Duke
1996). The implication is that my estimates of the prevalence of host country identity
4 Around 6% of the sample report an English, Scottish, Welsh, or Northern Irish identity, compared to
38% who report a British identity.
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in the refugee group may be attenuated compared to others, since I am unable to
account for differential discriminatory experiences with these data.
3.3 Immigrant groups
Since January 2010, foreign-born respondents in the LFS have been asked ‘What was
your main reason for coming to the UK?’. They may give only one of 8 possible
responses.5 I deﬁne economic immigrants as those who say they came ‘For
employment’, student immigrants as those who say they came ‘For study’, family
immigrants as those who say they came for one of three family-related reasons (‘To
get married/form a civil partnership’; ‘As a spouse/dependent of a UK citizen’; and
‘As a spouse/dependent of someone coming to UK’),6 and refugees as those who say
they came ‘Seeking asylum’.7 Finally, I combine those who said they either came
‘As a visitor’ or for ‘Other reasons’ into an ‘other’ category.
This key question concerns the ‘main reason’ for coming to the country, rather
than the legal channel through which a person entered. However, the response
categories do broadly correspond with legal channels for entry, and it is therefore
possible that some respondents give their original legal channel, while others respond
with their true ‘main reason’. In particular, immigrants who do not require a visa,
such as those from European Union countries, may give their true main reason, while
those from outside the European Union may be more inclined to give their legal entry
channel. Both legal entry channel and true main reason seem likely to correspond to
the group differences of interest, so this potential ambiguity in the question does not
lead me to anticipate a particular bias in one direction or the other. I show results with
EU and non-EU immigrants separated below.
The LFS does not survey ‘communal establishments’ such as hotels, hostels, or
university accommodation, and language difﬁculties or nervousness about
responding to government surveys may also make some people less willing to
respond. These feature of the survey mean that recent immigrants of all types are
likely to be under-sampled, but the exclusion of communal establishments is likely to
disproportionately reduce the sample of recent international students, and recent
refugees may be more affected by language difﬁculties or reluctance to participate
than other groups (Ofﬁce for National Statistics 2007). If those who miss the survey
at this stage are less likely to hold a British identity than those who participate, my
key estimates for these groups may be biased upwards.
Since the UK is a rich country with a restrictive work visa regime, some mea-
surement error could plausibly arise from economic migrants answering that they
came primarily for one of the non-economic reasons. This might be the case if the
respondent felt that being an economic immigrant was less socially desirable, or if
5 Less than 1% of adult immigrant respondents change their ‘main reason’ over the ﬁve waves of the LFS.
6 From 2015, ‘To get married/form a civil partnership’ was dropped, and the two other family-related
options were modiﬁed slightly. They became ‘As a spouse/partner/child under 18 of a UK citizen or person
with indeﬁnite leave to remain in the UK’ and ‘As a spouse/partner/child under 18 of someone coming into
the UK or already living here, who does not have indeﬁnite leave to remain’.
7 See Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2018) for a discussion of the different legal deﬁnitions of ‘refugee’ and
‘asylum seeker’ in the UK.
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she arrived in a non-economic visa category, and felt that revealing an economic
motive in a government survey would carry legal risks. The overall effect of this
measurement error would be to make the economic and non-economic immigrant
categories more similar, attenuating the key differences I report.
As an informal check on the immigrant groups produced by this survey measure,
Fig. 1 shows kernel density estimates of age on arrival for economic, student, family,
and refugee immigrants. One would generally expect the arrival of student immi-
grants to be concentrated around university age, while the arrival of economic
migrants should be concentrated on working age, and the arrival of family immi-
grants and refugees should be spread more evenly across different age groups.
Consistent with these expectations, Fig. 1 shows that those who identify themselves
as student immigrants most often arrive in their early twenties, while those who
identify themselves as economic immigrants are more concentrated in their mid-
twenties on arrival. Refugee and family arrivals are both more evenly spread across
younger and older ages. Family arrivals peak in the pre-school age group as well as
in the mid-20s, as this group contains both those who migrated as young children
with parents, and those who migrated as adults with partners or other family
members.
As an additional check on the plausibility of the refugee group identiﬁed by this
measure, Fig. 2 compares the frequency of arrival years among refugees in the
sample (on the left axis) with the aggregate number of ‘grants of asylum’ per year
reported by the UK government (on the right axis). Again, this is only an approx-
imate indication, but the pattern of arrival years in the sample clearly echoes the
aggregate government data up to around 2005. After this point there is a divergence
between the two series, with grants of asylum rising while the frequency of arrival
years in the sample declines. This may reﬂect the difﬁculty of sampling recent


















Fig. 1 Distribution of age on arrival by immigrant group. Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. This chart
shows kernel density estimates of age on arrival for economic, student, family, and refugee immigrants.
Notes: Foreign-born respondents aged 16 and over. Distributions are not shown before the arrival age of 2
or beyond the arrival age of 45 in order to protect the conﬁdentiality of respondents, in line with the
requirements of the data provider
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4 Characteristics of the different immigrant groups
I report selected demographic and human capital characteristics of each immigrant
group in Table 1. Compared with economic immigrants, family immigrants and
refugees are more likely to be from an ethnic minority and are more likely to be from
an origin country outside the EU. Around 44% of all immigrants report a British
national identity: 25% of economic immigrants, 31% of student immigrants, 62% of
family immigrants, and 53% of refugees. These are substantial differences, and in
line with expectations based on implied differences in time horizons.
There are other indications in Table 1 that family immigrants and refugees tend to
have longer time horizons in the UK. Around 39% of family immigrants and 49% of
refugees have dependent children in their household, compared to 36% of economic
immigrants. Having children generally indicates a longer intended stay, since it
makes both migration and return migration more costly (Dustmann and Görlach
2016). Table 1 also shows that around 61 and 54% of family immigrants and
refugees have taken up British citizenship, compared to 23% of economic immi-
grants.8 Citizenship gives individuals the permanent right to live in the UK, and the
right to vote in UK elections. However, the process of acquiring citizenship can be
costly: the fee in 2018 is over £1300, and most applicants must have lived in the UK
for at least ﬁve years, must not have a recent criminal record, and must be able to
pass both a language test and a test of cultural knowledge (these fees and require-
ments of citizenship are lower for spouses of British citizens, and for those who
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Year of arrival
Arrivals in sample Grants of asylum in UK
Fig. 2 Comparison of refugee arrival years in sample with grants of asylum. Source, LFS, 2010–2017 and
Home Ofﬁce (2018b). This chart compares the frequency of arrival years among refugees in the sample (on
the left axis) with the aggregate number of grants of asylum per year reported by the UK government (on
the right axis) between 1984 and 2016. Frequencies are not shown before 1984 or beyond 2016 in order to
protect the conﬁdentiality of respondents, in line with the requirements of the data provider
8 Respondents are asked “What is your nationality?” This is usually interpreted as a question about
citizenship, although it is possible that some respondents associate ‘nationality’ with ethnicity or country of
birth.
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Table 1 Selected characteristics of sample by immigrant group
Economic Student Family Refugee Other Total
National identity
British 0.25 0.31 0.62 0.53 0.50 0.44
(0.43) (0.46) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
General demographic and human capital characteristics
Female 0.43 0.49 0.66 0.43 0.56 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Years since migration 16.24 14.84 28.14 15.88 24.70 21.36
(17.82) (15.31) (19.96) (12.14) (19.45) (19.16)
Age on arrival 27.42 22.40 17.95 26.79 25.07 22.84
(8.71) (6.56) (13.76) (11.74) (14.70) (12.19)
Years of education (UK)a 0.47 2.32 6.00 1.49 2.77 3.11
(2.26) (3.61) (7.36) (3.96) (5.78) (5.80)
Years of education (Foreign)a 12.86 13.57 7.38 9.89 9.83 10.47
(4.91) (4.72) (6.62) (5.61) (6.17) (6.32)
Missing education information 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.07
(0.27) (0.19) (0.27) (0.23) (0.31) (0.26)
In full-time education 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.08
(0.13) (0.45) (0.25) (0.28) (0.18) (0.28)
Citizen 0.23 0.30 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.43
(0.42) (0.46) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49)
Has kidsa 0.36 0.29 0.39 0.49 0.32 0.36
(0.48) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.47) (0.48)
Ethnicity
White 0.66 0.35 0.46 0.13 0.56 0.50
(0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.34) (0.50) (0.50)
Black African or Caribbean 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.35 0.15 0.12
(0.27) (0.36) (0.32) (0.48) (0.36) (0.33)
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi 0.13 0.18 0.28 0.10 0.15 0.19
(0.34) (0.39) (0.45) (0.31) (0.35) (0.40)
Mixed/Other 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.42 0.15 0.18
(0.34) (0.46) (0.36) (0.49) (0.35) (0.38)
International region of origin
EU 0.57 0.26 0.26 0.03 0.32 0.35
(0.50) (0.44) (0.44) (0.18) (0.47) (0.48)
Africa 0.09 0.18 0.16 0.40 0.23 0.16
(0.29) (0.39) (0.36) (0.49) (0.42) (0.37)
Asia 0.20 0.39 0.38 0.38 0.20 0.30
(0.40) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48) (0.40) (0.46)
Elsewhere 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.18
(0.35) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) (0.43) (0.39)
Country groups
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investment in citizenship will only be worthwhile if they intend to stay in the host
country for a substantial period of time.
4.1 Identity assimilation trajectories and selective attrition
Figure 3 shows the proportion of each immigrant group reporting a British national
identity over years since migration. Almost no one who is newly arrived in the
country reports a British national identity. The higher level of British identity among
family immigrants and refugees emerges among those who have been in the country
less than 5 years, and just over 80% of those who have been in the country for 40
years or longer identify as British. Economic immigrants who have been in the
country for a longer time are also more likely to report a British national identity, but
the gradient is less dramatic, and just over 60% identify as British after 40 years in
the country. Student immigrants who have been in the country for 5 years are similar
to economic immigrants in their level of British identity, but their gradient is steeper
after this point, and student immigrants who have been in the country for at least 40
years look more like family immigrants and refugees in this respect.
Figure 3 does not show pure identity assimilation trajectories. Given that this
sample is a pooled cross-section, both the overall rate of identity assimilation, and
that of the different immigrant groups, are likely to be affected by selective attrition.
In general, if immigrants who feel less British are more likely to return to their origin
country over time, then the proportion of immigrants who report a British national
identity will rise over years since migration without any causal effect of time in the
country. The key question for my purposes is whether the heightened identity-
assimilation of family immigrants and refugees at a given number of years in the host
country is produced purely by differential selective attrition rather than by differences
in the propensity to take up the host identity. Although it is not possible to exclude
this possibility with cross-sectional data, it does not seem likely. Indeed, the bias
seems more likely in the other direction. The limited administrative data that exist in
the UK suggest that there are high outﬂows of both economic and student immigrants
Table 1 continued
Economic Student Family Refugee Other Total
Non-EU origin country 0.43 0.74 0.74 0.97 0.68 0.65
(0.50) (0.44) (0.44) (0.18) (0.47) (0.48)
Commonwealth origin country 0.29 0.42 0.54 0.27 0.48 0.42
(0.45) (0.49) (0.50) (0.44) (0.50) (0.49)
Requires Visa to visit UK 0.33 0.57 0.57 0.91 0.50 0.50
(0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.28) (0.50) (0.50)
Sample composition
Proportion of sample 0.31 0.16 0.37 0.05 0.11 1.00
n 23,619 11,784 28,166 3910 8545 76,024
Source: LFS 2010–2017. Notes: Foreign-born respondents aged 16 and over. Sample means and standard
deviations (in parenthesis)
aInformation for parenthood and education is missing for 3 and 7% of the sample respectively
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over time (Home Ofﬁce 2014). If these outﬂows consist disproportionately of those
who feel less British, then the rate of identity assimilation for economic and student
immigrants will be boosted relative to refugees and family immigrants, who are less
likely to leave the country (Bijwaard 2010; Home Ofﬁce 2014). As with the effect of
potential measurement error in the immigrant categories, the implication is that
differential selective attrition attenuates the key differences in national identity I
report.
5 Results
In this section, I assess the extent to which differences in national identity between
immigrant groups are driven by their distinct observable characteristics. I estimate a
probit model of the form








where BRITISH is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if individual i reports a
British national identity. STUDENT, FAMILY, REFUGEE, and OTHER are dummy
variables representing membership of each immigrant group, with economic immi-
grants acting as the reference category. X represents a vector of control variables,
including gender,9 year of survey, and ‘currently in full-time education’.
I include 3 controls for ethnicity (‘Black African or Caribbean’, ‘Indian/Pakistani/
Bangladeshi’, and ‘Mixed/Other’), with ‘White’ as the reference category. I note




























Fig. 3 Proportion of each immigrant group reporting British national identity over years since migration.
Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. Notes: Foreign-born respondents aged 16 and over. Averages by
group at 5 year intervals
9 The same proportion of men and women in the sample report a British identity (44%), and the key
estimates are comparable when estimated separately by gender. See Table 5 in the Appendix.
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the basis of their own ethnicity, and minority status is also linked to the experience of
discrimination, which is shown elsewhere to reduce identiﬁcation with the host
society (Georgiadis and Manning 2013). In order to account for the inﬂuence of
exposure to the host society, as emphasized by Dustmann (1996), I include a quartic
in age of arrival, and a quartic in years since migration. Figures 4 and 5 in the
Appendix show that these quartic terms capture the identity assimilation process
well, when compared with using separate dummies for each year. I omit age and year
of arrival, since the inﬂuence of these factors cannot be separately identiﬁed from
those for age on arrival, years since migration, and year of survey. I also include
quadratic terms in years of accumulated domestic and foreign education, to account
both for any direct inﬂuence of education on identity, and for the close form of
societal exposure that host-country education implies.
Origin country is a particularly important feature of the model. It can account for
the circumstances of a respondent’s legal relationship with the UK, such as visa
availability and restrictions, as well as access to UK citizenship. It can also account
for the inﬂuence of any historical or cultural afﬁnity or enmity between the origin
country and the UK, and the size of an immigrant’s potential community of co-
nationals. There may also be origin-country-level variation in the understanding of
national identity itself. For example, given conventions in the home country,
immigrants from France may consider the legal dimension more important in
choosing an identity, while those from Germany may consider ethnicity more
important (see Kiss and Park 2014, on these national differences in the concept of
national identity). As far as sample size will allow, I therefore control for each
individual origin country. I am able to do so for 132 countries (covering around 98%
of the sample), and I account for the remainder with four broad controls for inter-
national region of origin (EU, Africa, Asia, Elsewhere). In my preferred speciﬁca-
tion, I also interact each of these origin dummies with the quartic in years since
migration, in order to allow different identity assimilation trajectories for immigrants
from different countries who have been in the UK for a similar length of time.
Economic outcomes such as employment status or wages could plausibly be
important in the adoption of a new national identity for immigrants. Such outcomes
may be a particular concern when comparing national identity across different
immigrant groups, since refugees and family immigrants are sometimes more likely
to struggle on the labour market than others (Aydemir 2011; Bevelander and Pen-
dakur 2014; Cobb-Clark 2006; DeVoretz et al. 2005; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2018).
However, controlling for economic outcomes may be problematic, since, like the
adoption of a new national identity, they represent outcomes of the immigrant
assimilation process. I therefore omit them from my preferred model, but present
results with employment and pay controls in Table 6 in the Appendix for reference.
The main coefﬁcients of interest are unaffected by controlling for employment status,
and rise slightly when controlling for weekly pay.10 This is consistent with results
controlling for economic outcomes reported in Dustmann (1996) and Manning and
Roy (2010).
10 Due to the design of the LFS, controlling for weekly pay is only possible for a subset of employed
respondents who are not self-employed, and who are interviewed in the ﬁrst or ﬁfth waves of the survey.
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The key estimates produced by my approach (β1, β2, and β3) represent average
differences in British national identity between economic immigrants and each non-
economic immigrant group, after accounting for observed differences in character-
istics represented by the control variables I discuss above. They are conditional
correlations rather than causal estimates, and should be viewed as a way of assessing
whether the data are consistent with my observations on immigrant groups, time
horizons, and national identity. This approach is unable to separate differences
between immigrant groups which emerge in the host country from those which are
pre-existing in the origin county. For example, through some process of self-selec-
tion, it is possible that refugees and family immigrants arrive in the UK already more
or less inclined to adopt a British national identity than those in other immigrant
groups. However, establishing the size of any potential group differences in national
identity is my primary objective, and whether these differences emerge pre-
dominantly before or after migration is not crucial for this exercise. Indeed, it is
plausible that group differences in average time horizons could emerge almost
entirely before migration takes place.
5.1 Baseline results
Table 2 shows the key average marginal effects from estimating model (1). Column
1 shows results with only controls for year of survey, Column 2 shows results with
additional controls for demographic and human capital characteristics, age on arrival,
and years since migration. Column 3 shows results with controls for country of
origin. Results from my preferred model with origin controls interacted with years
Table 2 Baseline results: Average marginal effects from models of British national identity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic REF REF REF REF REF
Student 0.060 0.029 0.004 0.001 0.001
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Family 0.372 0.097 0.057 0.053 0.053
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)***
Refugee 0.272 0.112 0.038 0.031 0.031
(0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*
Other 0.246 0.078 0.036 0.033 0.033
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)***
Base probability 0.252 0.382 0.411 0.413 0.413
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)***
Controls
Personal characteristics – Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin – – Yes Yes Yes
Origin*ysm – – – Yes Yes
Clustering on origin – – – – Yes
Source: LFS 2010–2017. n= 76,024. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Foreign-born respondents
aged 16 and over. Personal characteristics include gender, years since migration, age on arrival, years of
education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black African or Caribbean,
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. Origin controls are 132 individual countries
covering 98% of the sample, and 4 dummies covering international regions (EU, Africa, Asia, Elsewhere)
for the rest
* denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ** at 1% and *** at 0.1%
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since migration are presented in Column 4, and Column 5 repeats this preferred
speciﬁcation with standard errors clustered at the origin country level, on the grounds
that important shocks to identity may occur in origin-country communities.
The results in Column 1 simply reﬂect the raw differences apparent in Table 1.
Student immigrants are around 24% (6 percentage points) more likely to report a British
national identity than economic immigrants, while family immigrants are 148% (37
percentage points) more likely to do so, and refugees are 108% (27 percentage points)
more likely to do so. Column 2 shows that a large part of the difference between these
groups and economic immigrants is attributable to demographic and human capital
characteristics, with the estimates being reduced to 8, 25, and 29% (3, 10, and 11
percentage points) for student, family, and refugee immigrants respectively.
Student immigrants are indistinguishable from economic immigrants in their
propensity to report a British identity after controlling for origin in Column 3, while
both family and refugee immigrants remain more likely to report a British national
identity after controlling for origin and interacting origin with years since migration.
My preferred speciﬁcation in Column 4 suggests that family immigrants and refugees
are 13 and 8% (5 and 3 percentage points) more likely to report a British national
identity than economic immigrants respectively. The precision of these estimates
falls when I cluster standard errors at the origin country-level in Column 5, but the
key coefﬁcients remain statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
5.2 Heterogeneity by origin and citizenship
The average association between each immigrant group and national identity may be
driven by the distinct origin country composition of the different groups. For example,
Table 1 shows that family immigrants and refugees mostly come from countries outside
the EU, and from countries whose citizens require a visa to enter the UK. People in
these groups therefore face stronger incentives to become legal citizens in the UK, so
that they can work freely, vote, and travel abroad more easily. As I note above, some
immigrants may consider this legal dimension of their relationship with the host country
particularly important in choosing an identity. If taking up legal citizenship makes a
person feel British, and therefore leads her to report a British national identity, then my
baseline results in Table 2 could simply reﬂect these differences in legal incentives.
Table 3 suggests that this is not so, although identity does vary across immigrants
facing different legal incentives to acquire citizenship. Results in the ﬁrst two col-
umns come from re-estimating model (1) for immigrants from EU and non-EU
countries.11,12 The gap between the base probabilities (33 percentage points higher
for non-EU immigrants) is much larger than the differences between any of the
immigrant groups, which is consistent with the idea that legal incentives for
11 Excluding the 3,052 German-born respondents from the EU equation reduces the estimate for family
immigrants from 0.066 to 0.051 (SE= 0.006). This may reﬂect the impact of German-born children of
British military families stationed in Germany, who have since returned to the UK.
12 The UK referendum on membership of the European Union (the ‘Brexit’ vote) happened during the
period covered by this sample and could potentially have acted as a shock to identity for immigrants,
particularly those from the EU countries. I can ﬁnd no indication that it did (see Figure 6 in the Appendix).
Similarly, the ‘refugee crisis’ in the summer of 2015 does not seem to have affected the identity of refugees



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































National identity among economic and non-economic immigrants
citizenship matter for identity. However, the sign of the differences between immi-
grant groups remains the same as in my baseline results for both EU and non-EU
immigrants, with family immigrants and refugees most likely to report a British
national identity in both cases. In fact, the differences between groups are larger in
relative terms among those from within the EU. This may reﬂect the fact that eco-
nomic immigrants from within the EU have particularly short average time horizons
in the UK, due to the low travel and administrative costs of migration for this group,
and therefore face particularly weak incentives to adopt the host citizenship or
identity. Family immigrants from within the EU are 33% (7 percentage points) more
likely to report a British national identity than economic immigrants, while those
from outside the EU are 10% (6 percentage points) so. Refugees born in countries
within the EU are 82% (16 percentage points) more likely to report a British national
identity than economic immigrants, compared to 10% (5 percentage points) for those
from outside. (This second result should be interpreted with some caution, since the
number of respondents who report being born in an EU country and coming to the
UK as a refugee is relatively small.)13
Columns 3 and 4 repeat this exercise for immigrants from countries whose citizens
require a visa to enter the UK and those that do not, and the results are similar. This is
perhaps not surprising, since there is a large overlap between the non-EU immigrant
group and those from visa-requiring countries.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show results from re-estimating model (1) for immi-
grants with and without legal citizenship. The gap between the base probabilities (75
percentage points higher for citizens) is very large compared to any of the differences
between immigrant groups, reﬂecting the high rates of British identity among those who
are legal citizens. The sign of the differences between immigrant groups is again the
same as in my baseline results, with family immigrants and refugees more likely to
report a British national identity regardless of citizenship status, and the group differ-
ences in relative terms are larger among those without citizenship. This may be because
predicted take up of the host identity is particularly low among economic immigrants
without citizenship, at around 10%. Among citizens, family immigrants are around 4%
(3 percentage points) more likely to report a British national identity than economic
immigrants, compared to 46% (5 percentage points) among non-citizens. Refugees who
are citizens are only slightly more likely to report a British national identity than
economic immigrants (the gap is both small and imprecisely estimated), but those who
are non-citizens are 68% (7 percentage points) so.
The ﬁnal two columns of Table 3 show results from re-estimating model (1) sepa-
rately for immigrants from countries inside and outside of the British Commonwealth.
Table 1 showed that family immigrants are much more likely than economic immi-
grants to be from countries inside the Commonwealth. This is potentially important
since Commonwealth immigrants may feel an elevated linguistic or cultural afﬁnity
with the UK compared to others. Immigrants from these countries also have an auto-
matic right to vote in UK elections, which could plausibly increase a feeling of
13 There are 125 respondents in the sample who report being born in an EU country but coming the UK as
refugees. This is not necessarily mismeasurement: most of these respondents came to the UK before their
countries of origin were in the EU. It is also possible that some of these respondents were born in the EU
but sought asylum from a third country.
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belonging in the host polity. Indeed, the gap between the base probabilities in columns 7
and 8 (35 percentage points higher for Commonwealth immigrants) reﬂects the fact that
immigrants from inside the Commonwealth are much more likely to report a British
identity than those from outside. However, the results show that in fact the gap in
British identity between economic and non-economic immigrants is larger among those
from outside the Commonwealth. This may be because of the relatively low predicted
take up of the host national identity among economic immigrants from outside the
Commonwealth, at around 25%. Among those from inside the Commonwealth, family
immigrants are 7% (4 percentage points) more likely to report a British national identity
than economic immigrants, while those from outside the Commonwealth are 44% (11
percentage points) so. Refugees from inside the Commonwealth are only slightly more
likely to report a British national identity than economic immigrants (this estimate is
both small and imprecisely estimated), while those from outside the Commonwealth are
62% (15 percentage points) so.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 suggest that the higher tendency among
family immigrants and refugees to report a British national identity does not simply
reﬂect different take-up of legal citizenship, different incentives to take up legal
citizenship, or home country membership of the British Commonwealth. Indeed, the
group differences are largest in relative terms among those who are from outside the
Commonwealth, among those who are not ‘British’ in the strict legal sense, and
among those who face weaker legal incentives to become legally ‘British’.
6 Discussion
I examine how national identity varies between economic, student, family, and
refugee immigrants. I note that family immigrants and refugees often anticipate a
longer stay in the host country than those in other immigrant groups, and that this
may increase the expected gains associated with adoption of the host national
identity. My results are broadly consistent with this observation. After adjusting for
individual origin country and a rich set of demographic and human capital char-
acteristics, family immigrants and refugees are 13% and 8% more likely to report the
host national identity than economic immigrants respectively. This is a novel
descriptive result. It does not appear to be driven only by differences in legal citi-
zenship, by differences in incentives to acquire legal citizenship, or by home country
membership of the British Commonwealth.
Time horizons may therefore be a previously neglected determinant of immigrant
national identity. My analysis broadens an existing body of work that links economic
dimensions of immigrant assimilation with time horizons in the host country.
Dustmann (1993, 1999, 2008) shows how the educational investments and economic
assimilation of immigrants are shaped by intended length of stay, and my results
suggest that national identity may be considered part of a parallel assimilation pro-
cess which also varies dependent on time horizons in the host country. The dis-
tinction made by Cortes (2004) between the implied time horizons of economic and
refugee immigrants is also useful for understanding this identity assimilation process,
and I have been able to add an additional distinction between the implied time
horizons of family and student immigrants.
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More generally, if identity can vary according to an individual’s intent as well as
her observed characteristics at a given point in time, time horizons should perhaps be
considered when addressing other aspects of identity. Pursuing this observation is
beyond the scope of this paper, but, for example, it is plausible that the tendency of
an individual to develop an occupational identity may depend on the length of time
she expects to stay in that occupation, or that the strength of her identiﬁcation with a
particular local region depends on her anticipated duration of residence.
Time horizons are unobserved, and the average differences in national identity I
report between immigrant groups may be driven by some alternative unobserved
factor. For example, Dustmann (1996) emphasises the role of exposure to the host
society in developing a host identity, and it may be that family immigrants and
refugees experience more societal exposure than those from other immigrant groups
on average. I show above that these groups are more likely to have children, which
could increase societal exposure through engagement with institutions such as schools
and hospitals. I cannot exclude the possibility that such increased exposure explains
the elevated sense of British identity in these groups. However, separating the
inﬂuence of time horizons and societal exposure would be difﬁcult empirically, since
such exposure could both produce and reﬂect longer time horizons in the host country.
Another potential explanation is that refugees are more inclined to adopt a British
identity because of negative feelings about aspects of their origin society. This would
be consistent with Manning and Roy’s (2010) suggestion that immigrants are driven
to take up the host identity when the host country compares favourably with the
home country in economic and political terms, as well as with Georgiadis and
Manning’s (2013) observation that a feeling of tolerance and respect is important for
adopting the host identity. For family immigrants, the host country seems likely to
compare favourably with the origin country on a personal level, since they have by
deﬁnition migrated to be among family members who will no longer be present in the
home country. However, as with the role of societal exposure, longer time horizons
may be driven by the fact that the host country compares favourably with the home
country, or they may reﬂect this fact. Attempting to disentangle the underlying
mechanisms is a potential avenue for future research.
Different immigrant groups are often subject to separate immigration control
regimes by host countries, and it is therefore possible for governments to make policy
favouring the entry or settlement of one immigrant group over another. The results I
present here are descriptive, and cannot be used to inform this area of policy directly.
The causal mechanisms underlying the observed relationship would need to be
carefully identiﬁed before any such recommendation could be made. However, my
results do suggest that host-country governments might consider dimensions of
immigrant adjustment beyond the short-term economic criteria which so often
dominate. Immigrants from groups that do not typically thrive economically in the
short-term may turn out to be better adjusted in other respects.
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7 Appendix
Tables 4-6, Figs. 4–7.
Table 4 Average marginal effects from models of ‘Integrated’ and ‘Assimilated’ vs ‘Separated’ national
identity
Assimilated or Integrated Assimilated Integrated
Economic REF REF REF
Student 0.009 0.007 0.007
(0.005)* (0.005) (0.004)
Family 0.069 0.067 0.023
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Refugee 0.065 0.065 0.018
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)**
Other 0.047 0.044 0.014
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Base probability 0.402 0.376 0.063
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Controls
Personal characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Origin Yes Yes Yes
Origin*ysm Yes Yes Yes
n 76,024 72,566 45,997
Source: LFS 2010–2017. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Foreign born respondents aged 16 and
over. Personal characteristics include gender, years since migration, age on arrival, years of education (UK
and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black African or Caribbean, Indian/
Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. Origin controls are EU, Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere
* denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ** at 1% and *** at 0.1%
Table 4 shows results from estimating model (1) with three different outcome variables. ‘Assimilated’
means respondents only report a British identity, and ‘Integrated’ means respondents report both a British
and a foreign identity. ‘Assimilated or Integrated’ combines these two (this is the outcome variable used in
the main body of the paper). The base category in each case is ‘Separated’, i.e. the respondent reports only
a foreign identity. Due to the smaller sample size in the ‘Integrated’ column, in all three columns, ‘Origin’
controls are EU, Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere, rather than the country ﬁxed-effects used in the main body of
the paper.
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Economic REF REF REF
Student 0.009 0.015 0.005
(0.005)* (0.007)* (0.007)
Family 0.069 0.086 0.065
(0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Refugee 0.065 0.071 0.064
(0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
Other 0.047 0.048 0.047
(0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***






Origin Yes Yes Yes
Origin*ysm Yes Yes Yes
n 76,024 34,924 41,100
Source: LFS 2010–2017. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Foreign born respondents aged 16 and
over. Personal characteristics include gender, years since migration, age on arrival, years of education (UK
and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black African or Caribbean, Indian/
Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. Origin controls are EU, Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere
* denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ** at 1% and *** at 0.1%
Table 5 shows results from estimating model (1) separately for men and women. Due to the smaller sample
size in the ‘Men’ and ‘Women’ columns, in all three columns, ‘Origin’ controls are EU, Africa, Asia, and
Elsewhere, rather than the country ﬁxed-effects used in the main body of the paper
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Table 6 Average marginal effects from models of British national identity, with and without controls for









Economic REF REF REF REF
Student 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.019
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)* (0.008)*
Family 0.053 0.054 0.078 0.083
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Refugee 0.031 0.031 0.080 0.089
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)***
Other 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.041
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)***
Base probability 0.413 0.413 0.368 0.366




Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin*ysm Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment
controls
– Yes – –
Income controls – – – Yes
n 76,024 76,024 20,923 20,923
Source: LFS 2010–2017. Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * denotes signiﬁcance at 5%, ** at 1% and
*** at 0.1%. Foreign born respondents aged 16 and over. Personal characteristics include gender, years
since migration, age on arrival, years of education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education,
ethnicity (White, Black African or Caribbean, Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey.
Origin controls in the two ‘Employment status’ columns are 132 individual countries covering 98% of the
sample, and 4 dummies covering international regions (EU, Africa, Asia, Elsewhere) for the rest. Origin
controls in the two ‘Weekly pay’ columns are EU, Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere. Employment controls are
‘Employed’, ‘Unemployed’, and ‘Inactive’. Income controls are ‘Gross weekly pay in main job’ and its
square (due to the design of the LFS, this information is only available on around 45% of the employed
sample)
Table 6 shows results from estimating model (1) with and without controls for employment status and
weekly income. Due to the smaller sample size, in the two ‘Weekly pay’ columns ‘Origin’ controls are EU,
Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere, rather than the country ﬁxed-effects used in the two ‘Employment status’
columns and in the main body of the paper
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Years since migration
Dummy for each year Quartic
Fig. 4 British national identity over years since migration represented as multiple dummy variables versus
a quartic. Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. This ﬁgure plots predicted probabilities of British national
identity over years since migration, estimated with (1) a model controlling for immigrant group, personal
characteristics, origin, and a dummy for each year since migration and (2) the same model with a quartic in
years since migration instead of a dummy for each year. Personal characteristics include gender, age on
arrival, years of education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black
African or Caribbean, Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. Origin controls are 132
individual countries covering 98% of the sample, and 4 dummies covering international regions (EU,
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Arrival age
Dummy for each age Quartic
Fig. 5 British national identity over age on arrival represented as multiple dummy variables versus a
quartic. Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. This ﬁgure plots predicted probabilities of British national
identity over arrival age, estimated with (1) a model controlling for immigrant group, personal char-
acteristics, origin, and a dummy for each arrival age and (2) the same model with a quartic in arrival age
instead of a dummy for each age. Personal characteristics include gender, years since migration, years of
education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black African or Caribbean,
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. Origin controls are 132 individual countries
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EU immigrants Non-EU immigrants
Fig. 6 British national identity for EU and non-EU immigrants, before and after “Brexit” referendum in
June 2016. Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. This ﬁgure plots predicted probabilities of British
national identity over month of survey, estimated separately for EU and non-EU immigrants. Each model
controls for immigrant group and personal characteristics. Personal characteristics include gender, years
since migration, age on arrival, years of education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education,
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Fig. 7 British national identity by immigrant group, before and after peak of refugee arrivals in the EU.
Source, LFS, 2010–2017. n= 76,024. This ﬁgure plots predicted probabilities of British national identity
over each calendar quarter, estimated separately for economic, student, family, and refugee immigrants.
Each model controls for international region of origin and personal characteristics. Origin controls are EU,
Africa, Asia, and Elsewhere. Personal characteristics include gender, years since migration, age on arrival,
years of education (UK and foreign), whether in full-time education, ethnicity (White, Black African or
Caribbean, Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi, Other), and year of survey. “Peak of refugee arrivals in the EU”
is October-December 2015 (Eurostat 2018)
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